Elected F.R.S. 1986 B y L .E J. R o b e r t s , F.R.S.
THOMAS NELSON MARSHAM was one of that band of distinguished men of strong intellect and strong personality who laid the foundations of a programme of nuclear power generation in this country on a sound technical basis. He joined the new atomic energy enterprise when it was still the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply, transferring to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority on its formation, and eventually retired from the UKAEA as a main board member in 1988.
After war-time service in the Merchant Navy, he was trained as a physicist and did his doctoral research in nuclear physics. This training enabled him to master rapidly the basic neutron physics underlying the operation of nuclear reactors but, as his career advanced in the UKAEA, he showed also an excellent grasp of engineering principles. Significantly he was elected to the Fellowship of Engineering in the same year as he was elected to the Royal Society. He attained managerial rank and responsibilities in the expanding AEA at a relatively early age, so his career inevitably mirrors the changing tasks and responsibilities of the Authority itself. However, he will be remembered mainly for two outstanding contributions. The first is to the development of gas-cooled reactors in this country. He played a major role in the successful commissioning of the first generation of gas-cooled reactors at Calder Hall and Chapelcross, and later in the introduction of the more efficient advanced gas-cooled reactors, for which he was a persuasive advocate. His second main interest was the development of the fast-neutron fission reactor, a technology in which he became a national and international authority. He saw the introduction of fast reactors as an essential step towards achieving the long-term gains to the national economy from nuclear power that he believed to be both possible and essential.
E a r l y y e a r s : e d u c a t i o n a n d w a r s e r v i c e
Tom Marsham -as he was known to everyone except some of his immediate family who called him 'Nelson' -was bom in 1923 into a family with strong seafaring connections. His father, Captain Thomas Brabban Marsham, O.B.E., was a master mariner in the Merchant Navy who died in war service in 1942. His mother Nelson) also came from a family with strong connections with the sea. Tom Marsham traced his forbears back to a line of seafarers operating from the small ports on the Solway Firth. They were innovative people; for example, they initiated the first lighthouse on the Solway Firth and considered but rejected construction of a canal linking the Solway Firth to the east coast at Newcastle. His maternal grandfather, Captain W.A. Nelson, was one of the most successful sailing ship captains, who continued to make a commercial success of long-distance cargo carrying under sail long after the advent of the steamship, partly due to his detailed study of sails and his care for the health of his crews. His son, Captain James Nelson, O.B.E., became Nautical Advisor to the Blue Funnel line and did much to promote new technical developments, encouraging the early adoption of radar, automation and advanced cargo handling. An earlier ancestor, Dr Philip Nelson, abandoned his medical practice in the last century to study a range of the then current scientific problems.
Tom Marsham was intensely proud of his family; in later years, senior Authority committees were occasionally treated to a brief homily on the virtues and achievements of one of them. It is easy to see the influences that resulted in an interest in science applied to the solution of practical problems and the motivation that led to a career of purposeful public service, a high ideal which Tom never lost. The interest in applied science as a means of improving industrial conditions and prosperity was further stimulated in his formative years by seeing the consequences of the use of outdated technology in the derelict ports, ironworks and coal mines of West Cumberland.
Tom Marsham was educated at Crosby Preparatory School and at Merchant Taylors School, Crosby, where he was strongly influenced by an outstanding and very demanding teacher of physics, H.M. Tunley, who provided a rigorous basis for his further science education. The school science teaching in general conveyed an enthusiasm for the subject, supplemented by an enterprising school science society. Tom's intention had been to follow in the family tradition and train on the school ship Conway as a navigating officer in the Merchant Navy, but this ambition had to be abandoned due to a last-minute discovery that he was colour-blind. The outbreak of war just after he had taken his School Certificate provided another opportunity to go to sea. Characteristically, he had no doubt that he should serve his country and he left school in 1941 to become a sea-going radio officer. He used the long delays inevitable in wartime operations to read about the new pathways opening up in science, and saw something of the rapid development of technology during the War. He was in the Far East on combined operations when the nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan, an event which stimulated his interest in nuclear fission.
Tom Marsham returned from his wartime service in 1946 and enrolled as a student first in the City of Liverpool Technical College and then in the University of Liverpool, reading physics, chemistry, mathematics and oceanography. He has acknowledged the general stimulus he received from Professor Proudman in the Oceanography Department and the specific encouragement towards nuclear physics that he received from Professor Sir James Chadwick. He took a first class in general science in 1949 and an honours degree in physics (2.1) in 1950. He was appointed to the Oliver Lodge Research Fellowship in the University of Liverpool in 1950, for nuclear physics research using the Liverpool cyclotron, with encouragement from Professor Chadwick and later Professor H.W.B. Skinner. The work was done under the direction of Professor J.R. Holt, F.R.S., to whom Tom always felt much indebted.
Professor Holt planned to continue researches already started with the refurbished 37 inch cyclotron, which produced a deuteron beam of 8 MeV energy. This beam was to be used to study the stripping reactions which can occur when the deuterons interact with target nuclei. In the stripping process, the neutron in the deuteron is captured by the target nucleus while the proton proceeds in a forward direction. The experiments consisted of measuring the angular distributions of groups of protons of various energies, separated by their different ranges in aluminium absorbers. The angular momentum of the captured neutron could be deduced from the angular distribution of the stripped proton, and the values compared with those expected from the shell model of the nucleus which had recently been propounded. At the time, no other laboratory was studying stripping reactions. Marsham undertook the design of a triple proportional counter which turned out to be a stable and sensitive device, able to collect a large amount of data rapidly. He also undertook the analysis of the experimental data, a tedious procedure in the days before the advent of computers, and maintained contact with the theoreticians in Liverpool on contentious aspects of the theory. The work was productive. Marsham was awarded his PhD in 1953 for a thesis entitled 'An investigation of deuteron stripping reactions', and Holt and Marsham published seven papers in 1952 and 1953 on this research (1-7)*.
ATOMIC ENERGY AND CALDER HALL
Tom Marsham joined the new atomic energy enterprise in 1953, working first as a physicist on uranium enrichment and diffusion plant problems in the Technical Policy Branch at Risley. The team was at that time concerned with planning the operation of the plants that were being built to produce the nuclear materials urgently required for the defence programme. Marsham took a particular interest in how the reactors and the diffusion plant fitted in to the whole strategy of producing fissile materials and recycling uranium. Early on he showed his capacity for analytical technical judgement, and his courage in arguing for the best technical solution. In a study of how the diffusion plant could be extended, he concluded that flow through the plant, which had just been brought on line, should be reversed and operated in the opposite direction. This solution involved stopping the plant, emptying it of uranium and repiping the bays. It cannot have been an easy or popular decision. However, the Managing Director, Christopher Hinton (later Lord Hinton), was convinced and the plan went ahead. Subsequent expansions were implemented economically and efficiently.
Tom Marsham had proved his worth. In 1955 he was appointed Reactor Manager of Calder Hall Nuclear Power Station. As Operations Manager, he played a major part in transforming the information and ideas based on previous work into properly documented stages of a tight but feasible programme for the commissioning and operation of the two reactors in Calder Hall 'A ' station, which became the model for all subsequent Magnox reactors. The commissioning was completely successful and completed faster than the commissioning of any new design of power reactor before or since. During this period, Tom Marsham demonstrated the characteristics his colleagues came later to recognize: his absolute dedication to the job in hand, his instinct to lead from the front, his capacity for hard work and his ability to inspire others. He was present whenever anything important or novel was happening, working for seven days a week and sometimes nights as well. He had been appointed to the job less than 12 months before fuel loading was scheduled. This stage was brought forward from July to May 1956 to enable a royal opening to be planned for October. In consequence, not all the equipment was ready and fully tested when the operations staff took over the plant and fuel had to be loaded manually. Nevertheless, loading to create an initial, barely critical structure and the careful, intensive calibration that this demanded, was completed safely and successfully in four days. This pace was maintained for some ten weeks, when the plant started to generate electricity, two years and eleven months from digging a hole in the ground. The Queen officially opened Calder Hall in October 1956, less than three months later. This commissioning exercise was the pattern for all eight reactors built to this design at Calder Hall and Chapelcross. It has been a successful design; the reactors were designed for a 20 year life but are still functioning after 35 years, and following a recent review, further life extension to 40 years has been agreed.
Reactor physics and engineering were still in the pioneering phase in the 1950s. Although many of the important parameters in neutron physics were established in experiments in low-power research reactors, many measurements had to be checked and extended using instrumentation in the Calder Reactors. The Calder Hall reactors are pressurized, carbon-dioxide cooled, graphite moderated reactors fuelled with natural uranium and designed to produce both plutonium and electricity. The first 18 months' experience of operation of the first two reactors was reported at the Geneva Conference held in September 1958. The distribution of the flow of carbon dioxide in the various fuel channels had to be corrected to attain optimum temperature conditions; after this correction, the designed power output of 180 MW per reactor (42 MW electrical output) had been surpassed, with the normal operating power being 200 MW. The neutron physics measurements had been satisfactory. Careful measurements had been made of the control rod parameters, the temperature differentials throughout the system, the changes as fuel irradiation proceeded and the properties of the fuel elements. A design alteration to the fuel cartridge had been shown to be necessary to compensate for the internal stresses in the uranium caused by the production of fission products. Extra facilities for complete temperature measurement throughout the reactor had been added to eliminate uncertainties in the maximum temperature of fuel elements, which was the control parameter (8).
Tom Marsham left Calder Hall devoted to reactor technology after the commissioning of Reactor No. 2 in 1957 and returned to Risley as Deputy Chief Physicist, Reactors, but returned to Windscale in 1958 as Deputy Works General Manager, Windscale and Calder Works, responsible for the commissioning of the two reactors of Calder 'B ' station and operation of the four reactors at Calder Hall, and for the prototype advanced gas-cooled reactor. By 1962, four years' operating experience had been accumulated and, although the station had been operated as a production unit, a considerable programme of experimental work was being done both to improve the understanding of the reactors themselves and also to aid the civil nuclear power stations then under construction. But the efficiency of production remained a primary goal. For example, the reactors had to be shut down for fuel changing, and a major objective was to reduce to a minimum the off-load periods. A fuel change consisted in rem oving and replacing som e 10 000 fuel elem ents using remote-handling equipment, working through gas seals in a temperature of 140 °C. Improvements to the discharge equipment, the provision of better viewing equipment and the training of a specialist discharge team reduced the shutdown period for a fuel change from about 80 days initially to 23 days. Careful planning and staffing arrangements enabled the necessary maintenance and inspection of the coolant flow, heat-removal and safety circuits to be completed in approximately the same time as the fuel handling, leading to very little loss of production from those causes. These improvements also resulted in a reduction of about 30% in both the mean and the maximum radiation dose to personnel during the five years when the reactor output increased by 25% (9, 11).
The performance of the instrumentation and automatic protection circuits was kept under review and was satisfactory. The policy on safety was to arrange that the reactor would be shut down by either of two different types of instrument measuring two different physical parameters. In spite of this, the value of the reactor operator in ensuring safety was also demonstrated. The only major faults that arose originated in the associated electrical equipment. In 1958 a turbo alternator disintegrated during its commissioning and on another occasion the site mains electrical supply suffered a severe disturbance due to a fault in one alternator excitor. The safety systems protected the reactors in both cases, but modifications were undertaken to provide additional protection against these types of fault (11).
There was early emphasis on operator training; education and proper training was an abiding interest of Tom Marsham. Specialist training was provided at the Calder Hall Reactor Operations School, where the work included experience using a reactor simulator. All operating procedures were performed strictly in accordance with detailed written instructions. The cause of any shutdown had to be satisfactorily established before start-up again was authorized. The training provided resulted in very reliable plant operation. The number of unplanned plant shutdowns reduced from twelve in 1956 to four in 1961, only one of which was due to human error. The average availability increased to 88.1% of the maximum possible output of the four reactors at Calder Hall by 1961; refuelling and the experimental programme accounted for 7.9% of the 11.9% downtime, and shutdown due to equipment faults or human error amounted to 1.4%. It was a remarkable achievement ( 12).
These tight production targets were achieved in reactors that were being used, in part, for experimental work directly in aid of problems arising in the design, commissioning and operation of the civil nuclear power stations, the Magnox reactors. A White Paper presented to Parliament in 1955 proposed an initial programme of 1500-2000 MW. The first station, Bradwell, was commissioned in 1962 and eventually nine commercial stations with a net output of nearly 5000 MW were completed. These reactors are of the Calder Hall type, gas-cooled, graphite moderated, natural uranium fuelled reactors, but there are significant differences. The Magnox reactors were designed to be efficient generators of electricity, with higher thermal power than the Calder Hall reactors, higher average fuel rating and higher coolant inlet and outlet temperatures. Further, the Magnox reactors were designed for on-load refuelling, and with the aim of achieving much higher burn-up of the fuel before discharge.
Consequently, when equilibrium conditions were achieved in the civil Magnox stations, fuel was discharged when about 40% of the heat being produced resulted from fission of Pu-239. The changed composition of the fuel at high irradiation materially changed the physics and kinetics of the reactors compared with the conditions normally experienced in the Calder reactors. Experimental verification was required to check theoretical predictions of reactor parameters as a function of fuel irradiation, to examine changes in reactor stability, to measure transient responses and to obtain practical experience of operating a reactor with a positive moderator temperature coefficient of reactivity. Tom Marsham pressed hard that this programme should go ahead by sacrificing some of the military production on one of the Calder reactors, seeing the need to give priority to the larger national requirement. This was agreed, and a special two year experimental programme was instituted in Calder Reactor No. 3, during which time a complete charge would be irradiated to an average exposure of 1000 MWd/t, with a maximum cartridge irradiation of 2000 MWd/t. One of the key experiments was to make measurements of the reactor stability as irradiation reached levels where the temperature coefficient of the moderator became positive (i.e. reactivity increased with temperature). All the data required were collected and the operational experience with the reactor in this mode was satisfactory. Considerable ingenuity was also shown in devising experimental conditions which simulated the conditions to be expected when some fault might cause large and rapid increases in temperature (10).
As well as contributing to a better understanding of reactor physics, the Calder reactors were used for extensive materials testing. Because of the larger heat transfer required, the design of the fuel elements for the civil reactors differed markedly from that of the simple Calder Hall fuel elements, with various forms of spiral finning. First tests of these designs resulted in failures caused by mechanical damage due to rattling in the channel gas flow. Modifications were introduced to counter this, and tests of civil element designs proceeded, with simulations of on-load fuelling and of thermal cycling. Testing of non-fissile material, graphite, steel and concrete were also undertaken to ensure the safety of the Calder and of the Magnox reactors.
GAS-COOLED REACTOR DEVELOPMENT
Another main responsibility that fell to Tom Marsham while he was Deputy Works General Manager at Windscale was the commissioning of the prototype advanced gas-cooled reactor, WAGR. The AGR series of reactors was designed to overcome the inherent limitations of the Magnox reactors which were due to the use of natural uranium metal fuel, limiting fuel rating, burn-up and temperatures. The AGRs were designed to run on a fuel that was inert in carbon dioxide up to high temperatures, slightly enriched uranium dioxide clad in stainless steel. The coolant outlet temperature was to be raised to 600-700 °C, to attain an expected thermal efficiency of over 40%. The WAGR was designed to be both a test bed and a demonstration plant of 30 MW(e) output.
The commissioning exercise was planned in the same meticulous way as had been the commissioning of the Calder reactors. Tom Marsham suggested that shift teams of senior operators be formed to supervise the exercise, and then characteristically volunteered to join the teams himself. A full account of the start-up of the Windscale AGR shows great attention to detail, coupled with flexible and innovative methods of dealing with difficulties as they arose, but all tightly controlled to achieve maximum efficiency and to meet target dates. Plant tests before fuel loading revealed the need for modifications to heat exchanger internals. A review of the programme confirmed that the reactor itself could be ready to receive fuel earlier than the work inside the heat exchangers and biological shield could be completed. It was decided to proceed simultaneously with fuel loading and the remedial work, deferring final engineering testing to the low-power nuclear commissioning period, so as to save about 35 days. Such were the high standards of efficiency characteristic of the expectations and discipline of the time (14).
Several modifications were made to speed up fuel handling. The planned commissioning time between the start of fuel loading and full power operation was 159 days, to include core loading, nuclear experiments such as control rod calibration, temperature coefficients and hot control-rod measurements, circuit proving tests and the completion and inspection of the remedial works. In fact, all this was completed in 169 days. Much information was gathered relevant to the various safety circuits and used to define the parameters necessary to maintain the principle that every fault be covered by at least two different types of protection circuit. It was demonstrated that all the faults studied could be controlled adequately by the circuits available. The reactor was brought to its full designed output in a period of 11 days after low power commissioning.
The prime role of WAGR was to assist the design and economic success of the commercial AGRs. Tom Marsham with his characteristic firm grasp of technical policy played a key role in setting priorities in the development programme. The much-increased temperatures and ratings required by an AGR compared with the Magnox reactors created a range of fresh problems. Improved graphite had to be developed, with adequate dimensional stability and resistance to radiolytic oxidation by the coolant in the higher neutron fluxes of an AGR, and those properties had to be demonstrated for an estimated reactor life of over 30 years. Limiting conditions of temperature and rating had to be established. These materials problems were addressed in several experimental facilities, including the Materials Testing Reactors at Harwell and the Dounreay Fast Reactor, but the large-scale, statistical testing available in the WAGR was a critical gain. The prototype reactor was also used to demonstrate techniques for optimizing fuel usage, checking the theoretical optimizations that were being developed in parallel, and testing the behaviour of fuel assemblies under conditions of power cycling and with deliberately defective cladding (13, 15). Marsham realized the economic importance of developing reliable high bum-up fuel, to minimize reprocessing costs and the volume of radioactive wastes to be handled and disposed of, and initiated programmes of improved fuel development in WAGR which raised the target bum-up by 33%. He masterminded the use of an AGR gas channel testing at Windscale to test the on-load refuelling features of the commercial designs and to simulate the effect of a dropped fuel assembly.
Marsham could fairly claim by the time WAGR was closed down, in 1981, that the plant had demonstrated successfully that the underlying technology was sound and had also proved to be an efficient generating station in its own right. He always paid generous tribute to the quality of the team he had led. Marsham was also instrumental in squeezing the last experiments of value from the prototype reactor. He conceived the idea of a set of final tests carried out in WAGR, testing fuel pin clusters up to the peak temperature postulated to occur in some fault conditions, and checking the predictions of the computer codes used in studying faults which could lead to large changes in power and gas flow. These tests were made successfully. After the reactor had been shut down, he argued that the WAGR should become the vehicle for a decommissioning exercise at an early date, to develop the techniques necessary to decommission large gas-cooled reactors when it became necessary to do so.
It is not surprising that Tom Marsham remained a staunch defender of gas-cooled reactors, given his detailed knowledge of them and his experience of their development. In several papers and lectures, he outlined their virtues and their promise: the concrete pressure vessels avoided the need for the quality assurance required to guarantee steel pressure vessels; the benefits of a single-phase coolant; the long time-constant in reacting to fault conditions; the high thermal efficiency; the low radiation doses to operators. Principally, he argued that gas-cooled reactors were 'forgiving' systems, free from the need for rapid operator response (15, 34, 36) .
In a lecture to the British Nuclear Energy Society in 1982, Marsham speculated on the reasons why gas-cooled reactors had not been adopted more widely. He thought there may have been too many competing systems. He saw nothing wrong in continuing to build Magnox reactors in countries wanting unit sizes of about 300 MW(e) without fuel enrichment, and thought that AGRs were admirably suited to generation at 600-800 MW(e). But he acknowledged that serious problems had arisen during the construction of the AGRs, partly because of the high proportion of work on site rather than in a factory in the case of the early AGRs.
Marsham was undoubtedly disappointed that the opportunities opened up by the development work in WAGR and the parallel work on AGR design done at the AEA had not been followed by successful commissioning of all the commercial stations. By 1982, the AGR stations at Hinkley and Hunterston were showing load factors approaching 60% but the two stations ordered a year later, at Heysham and Hartlepool, were not commissioned and construction had been marred by time and cost overruns (as had been the case at Dungeness). Marsham pinned the blame on the structure and organization of the nuclear and engineering industry in this country rather than on the quality of AGR technology. He was influential in the establishment of the AGR Requirements Committee to steer the national R&D programme. However, he was encouraged by a government decision in 1978 to build two more AGR stations at Heysham and Tomess, based on the Hinkley design, and urged confidence in our ability to build AGRs well 'provided that we avoid the obvious mistakes of the past, multiplicity of designs, inadequate research and inappropriate industrial structures' (34).
N u c l e a r p o w e r p o l i c y
Tom Marsham returned to the headquarters of the Reactor Group of the AEA in 1965 as Director of Technical Operations, responsible for the technical planning of the AGR and fast reactor development programmes and for overall energy policy studies and use of resources and, in 1969, became Deputy Managing Director of the Reactor Group while remaining Director of Technical Resources. Under his direction the energy policy studies developed cost-effectiveness criteria for comparing the costs and availability of a range of nuclear and non-nuclear energy options on both a national and world scale. He became convinced of the large economic benefits that a steady development of nuclear power could bring to this country, a theme he developed in many papers and lectures.
Marsham praised the first formal statement on nuclear policy issued in February 1955 as far-sighted and correct in its forecasts. The first nuclear power programme was designed to introduce a new primary source of energy, and to provide an industrial base that could be expanded. The nuclear programme was oriented to meet an expanding demand for electricity which might outstrip available coal supplies and be dependent on expensive imported oil. Generating costs had reduced as the size of the Magnox reactors increased from Berkeley, 138 MW(e) to Wylfa, 600 MW(e); the AGRs were expected to show further cost reductions and fast reactors would be needed before the end of the century to avoid problems of the supply of low-cost uranium. The first plans drawn up in Risley envisaged a first generation totalling 5000 MW(e) by 1970, second generation stations approaching 8000 MW(e) in 1971-5 and a third generation up to 40 000 MW(e) by 1985 (15, 31) .
The economic justifications for a large nuclear programme based on those three generations of nuclear plant was argued in several papers. In the 1960s, electricity consumption was rising rapidly -it actually grew by more than a factor of three between 1955 and 1975 -and many predicted that this rate of increase would continue. An analysis of the total systems costs of a generating programme rising from 58 GW in 1970 to 200 GW in the year 2000 showed reductions in total systems costs of 15-20% by incorporating a large nuclear programme rising to 60% of the total capacity, with a corresponding large decrease in foreign exchange requirements, assumed to be needed to pay for imported oil. The fuel requirements for such a large programme meant that fast reactors would have to be introduced from the early 1980s. A complete systems study of the generating system was mounted as a computer model which was used to determine the optimum mix of stations of different types, taking account of imposed constraints such as achievable load factors and fuel availability. It was used to determine whether any more advanced thermal reactor systems, such as High Temperature Reactors or Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactors, would be required to supplement the AGRs before the introduction of the fast reactors. An early introduction of fast reactors was desirable, as soon as the reliability of such a novel system had been proved, on the argument that the reduced fuel costs would lead to lower generating costs, just as the reduced fuel costs of the AGRs were expected to lead to lower costs than fossil fuel burning in spite of larger capital costs (21, 22, 25) .
Marsham realized that a programme of this size was optimistic. However, the systems studies were repeated over a wide range of assumptions and always showed large benefits by moving to a high proportion of nuclear stations with an early introduction of fast reactors.
He remained a convinced advocate of this course; fossil fuels should be reserved for use in land and air transport and as chemical feedstocks. He realized that the large benefits predicted had to be fought for. The basic costs of developing nuclear power in Britain were borne by the Government up to the stage of commercial exploitation but the net costs were decreasing by 1972 and would have to decrease further (22). The eventual justification had to be the overall effect on electricity prices and on the balance of payments. He acknowledged the difficulties caused for the nuclear design and construction companies by the low rate of ordering of plant, caused by the slow rate of economic growth and the advent of natural gas. But he regretted the method chosen for the introduction of the AGR system: competitive tendering against tight commercial conditions for a prototype plant, and the erratic rate of ordering which inhibited rational planning of component manufacture. The difficulties were compounded by the structure of the nuclear construction industry. There were five reactor construction companies in 1963, three in 1965, two in 1968 and finally one in 1974. Rationalization of the industry was necessary to avoid multiplicity of designs. He advocated determining which reactor system to build on general grounds, constructing a single lead station and delaying large-scale ordering unti 1 some experience had been gained (23). With the benefit of hindsight, many would agree with him.
At the closure of the W AGR in 1981, Tom Marsham regretted the 'emergence of loyalties and affiliations which tend to obscure rational arguments about reactor choice'. He welcomed the forthcoming public inquiry into the proposal to build a PWR at Sizewell; 'we must use that opportunity to set any advantages of the PWR against those possessed by the AGR and decide whether we should change horses, pursue two competing systems or concentrate on our own system' (34).
FAST REACTOR DEVELOPMENT
The need to introduce a reactor system that made more efficient use of the uranium fuel than any design of thermal reactors had been identified as an important goal for the medium term from the earliest days of the atomic energy project. The basic physics of fast reactor cores was established in zero energy reactors in Harwell in the early 1950s. The first Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR), of 14 MW(e) power, was commissioned in 1959 to solve the engineering problems associated with the design of high power density fast reactor cores and particularly the use of liquid metals as the coolant. As a result of successful work, authority to construct a 250 MW(e) Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) was given in 1966 and the reactor was commissioned in 1973. Tom Marsham became responsible for the programme in 1965; it became his major interest and he was recognized as a leading world authority on fast reactors.
The economic and strategic objectives were analysed as part of the technical policy work at Risley in the usual thorough way. Marsham set out the main results and the objectives of the programme in a series of papers. The initial targets were ambitious: to design commercial fast reactors with capital costs no higher and fuel cycle costs substantially lower than contemporary thermal reactors; to achieve a plutonium inventory doubling time short enough to match the electricity system doubling time; and to achieve designs that were acceptable on safety grounds. A first design of a 1000 MW(e) reactor was started in 1969.
Marsham saw clearly from the first the economic importance of reprocessing with short cycle times and the case for international sharing of reprocessing plants (18, 19, 20) .
A detailed study of the technical feasibility and total systems costs of recycling plutonium in several different thermal reactors as compared with a fast reactor cycle led to the conclusion that the savings of uranium ore and separative work in a fast reactor cycle more than offset slightly higher capital costs even at very modest fuel burn-up. These assessments determined the programme for the next 20 years. In the 1970s, the cheapest power system was thought to result from the earliest introduction of fast reactors (23, 24).
The PFR was designed to demonstrate all the features of a commercial reactor, so that the final step to commercial plants would be technically small. Major changes from DFR were: the use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide fuel; the use of sodium as coolant in place of sodium-potassium; a change to a pool design with all primary components in a single tank; and less expensive steam generators. The design of the core and the operation of the reactor proved to be successful; the sodium pumps and fuel handling machinery worked well. But the electricity output from PFR was disappointing for several years, mainly owing to leaks from welds in the steam generators. A comprehensive programme was instituted, designed to establish the mechanisms causing cracks in the welds and to devise remedial measures. It was a situation in which Tom Marsham displayed well his leadership qualities. He handled each crisis calmly, insisting on a thorough analysis of events and drawing on the right people. Eventually a technique of fixing leak-tight sleeves across the original welds was developed, and this proved completely successful for the evaporator units in which most of the leaks occurred. At the same time he supported strongly a case for ordering replacement superheater and reheater units using materials and designs selected for commercial units. This expensive undertaking was of great benefit years later when problems arose with the original units. But these problems on PFR cast doubts on the cost estimates of the fast reactor system and on its readiness for commercial exploitation, and led to delays in these plans.
There were other criticisms of fast reactors that drew much publicity in the 1970s, mainly concerned with the safety and security implications of handling plutonium as a main fuel. Marsham regretted the long drawn-out debate that ensued, seeing the perceptions of the key issues associated with safety and acceptability becoming increasingly illogical and subjective. He defended vigorously the good inherent safety characteristics of the system in a series of papers, listing the good thermal characteristics that lead to a slow development of faults, the ability to control the plutonium inventory, maintaining the plutonium in an inaccessible state, and the strong negative temperature coefficient and the very low radiation doses to operators. He saw the problem of maintaining security, containing the threat of terrorist activity and complying with international safeguards, as no more difficult -and perhaps easier -for fast reactor than for thermal reactor fuel cycles (27, 30, 32, 37) .
Though the engineering of the steam raising circuits proved to be more difficult than anticipated, the fuel and fuel cycles were successful. The demonstration of the fuel cycle from fabrication, irradiation, reprocessing and refabrication in dedicated plants was a vital decision of Tom M arsham's which placed Britain in the forefront of fast reactor development. He saw that the essential components were a long bum-up fuel and an efficient reprocessing plant with a short turnround time. The first target set for the oxide fuel was a bum-up of 7.5%; some fuel has now reached 20% bum-up, thus reducing the costs of reprocessing and the volumes of waste to be treated and disposed of. The fuel reprocessing plant at Dounreay has also exceeded original expectations, showing that the recycling of highly irradiated fuel can be achieved with small waste streams. To minimize reprocessing costs, Marsham proposed a European Demonstration Reprocessing Plant, to reprocess the fuel from three or four fast reactors as part of a joint European programme. A design study was made jointly by the AEA and BNFL and application made for siting at Dounreay. Tom would have been delighted to hear that, following a long planning inquiry, outline planning consent has been given for siting such a plant at Dounreay, though whether it will be built depends on the future evolution of the European programme.
Tom Marsham was not an instinctive internationalist. He was a great patriot and believed that Britain possessed the skill and the ability to pursue any technology as well or better than anyone else, so long as the main activity was situated in the north. A reference to a visit or a holiday in southern Europe was enough to draw from him immediate expressions of regret and sympathy. But he saw clearly the advantages of joint collaboration, in which several countries pooled their experience and worked together on parallel, large-scale projects. An evolutionary programme of that type would avoid the difficulties that had arisen in the thermal reactor programme from premature competition leading to cost-cutting and inadequate preparation (26, 40) .
He remained convinced of the overriding strategic advantages of fast reactors, a source of power potentially larger than all fossil fuel reserves, that was virtually independent of imported fuel and therefore immune to changes in fuel prices. His vision of the future was the establishment of self-contained nuclear power parks consisting of 6-8 fast reactors, one reprocessing plant and waste storage facilities, to minimize both costs and security problems. The long-term gains would justify building the lead commercial plants while the design and development teams remained in being, despite the prospect of the capital costs of the first plants being larger than present-day thermal reactors (41). He became the first Chairman of the Fast Reactor Joint Committee, the first formal forum providing a national approach to the development of fast reactors.
It was a serious disappointment to Tom Marsham that he could not see the Commercial Demonstration Fast Reactor launched before he retired and he found the changed circumstances affecting technical timetables hard to accept. He attended the final signing of the European Fast Reactor agreement at Bad-Godesburg and would have been dismayed by subsequent decisions limiting the size of the British contribution. He was one of a team of five who received the ESSO Energy Award of the Royal Society in 1978 for their work on fast breeder reactors, and he played an important part in the organization of a discussion meeting on 'The fast-neutron breeder fission reactor' held in the Royal Society in May 1989. He introduced the final discussion with a paper characteristically entitled 'Energy for 1000 years', in which he argued that fast reactor technology is already more soundly based than was the case for any other power system before its large-scale use (42). He will always be remembered as one of the greatest authorities on fast reactor technology, and one of its most consistent advocates. M a n a g e m e n t a n d g e n e r a l Tom Marsham became Managing Director of the Northern Division of the Atomic Energy Authority in 1977 and a full-time member of the Board of the Authority in 1979, as Member for Reactor Development. The Northern Division employed some 5500 staff with a turnover of nearly £200 million, and comprised the three laboratories at Springfields, Risley and Windscale, the Dounreay Establishment and a substantial Design and Construction team and Technical Office at Risley. His management style was probably as important as his technical contribution. He read every paper in great detail and was formidably well informed on every item on which he had to take a view. Every Board of Management meeting was the occasion for vigorous debates on all subjects. He kept in very close touch with all four sites and insisted on taking the whole Northern Division Management Board to each site every year. These visits, and the many he made alone, were widely welcomed by the staff as an opportunity to discuss both progress and problems with a man whose judgement they all respected. He was always interested in the welfare and development of young staff and apprentices. He saw himself as one of them; the leader of a team. He even continued to play in the annual rugby match against the Risley apprentices to well past an age when most would have given up, an endearing foible if a somewhat traumatic experience for the apprentices.
One of his many responsibilities within the AEA was to chair the committees directing all the main reactor development programmes, water-cooled reactors, SGHW and later PWR, gas-cooled reactors and fast reactors. He took a close interest in all of them. Although he believed most strongly in the AGR and FR, his practical philosophy was to make the best of any development and his technical judgements were just as valuable in water-cooled reactor programmes and, later, in non-nuclear work. His experience and wisdom were also used and appreciated outside the AEA itself. He was a non-executive Director of the Nuclear Power Company from 1975 to 1980, where his main contribution was to help to establish and maintain a strong fast reactor design team. He was a founder member of the CEGB's Nuclear Safety Committee, which he attended regularly for well over 20 years. He was a member of the Department of Energy's Advisory Council on Research and Development from 1974 until he retired. He was a non-executive Director of British Nuclear Fuels pic from 1979 until he died, a capacity in which he rendered most valued service. In everything he did, he held to his own high standards, always willing to give freely of his time to advise and encourage, and always able to question and to probe any proposal as a result of his own deep knowledge and technical ability. He had a razor-sharp intellect and he was never at ease unless he had studied deeply whatever was at issue. Thus he was able to argue his case very strongly and he could be impatient with views which were illconsidered or not based on thorough preparation. But at the end of a hard argument, Tom would accept a majority verdict and contribute to whatever had been decided without rancour.
Tom was a hard taskmaster but a fair one. He could rebuke a back-slider sharply but he was intensely loyal to his staff and to his colleagues. He will be remembered by his friends as an English gentleman who reflected the best qualities that such a description evokes, a man who was patriotic, courteous and considerate. He had a ready wit and he was marvellous company, with a fund of stories. He maintained an interest in nautical history, particularly of sail, and found time to lecture on the subject as well as sail his boat on the Cumbrian or Scottish coast. He always maintained a keen interest in education and training and was a member of the court of the University of Liverpool. It is fitting that a series of lectures in his memory will be given in that university and significant that they are supported by BNFL.
In June 1958 Tom Marsham married Dr Sheila Margaret Griffin, who survives him. They had two sons who have both followed the family's maritime traditions and embarked on successful careers in the Merchant Navy. Tom was a devoted family man. His unexpected death on 12 October 1989 was a great blow to his family and many friends and a serious loss to the nuclear industry. He will be remembered as a great figure and the disappointing delays of the later years will not detract from the high standards set in his pioneering work and the dedication and effort with which those standards were maintained throughout his life. 
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